Right now, I'm finishing up my dissertation on the epistemology of what are often called "bad beliefs" — beliefs that aren't merely false but also somehow pernicious. Through an exploration of the epistemology of testimony, perception, and trust, I argue that individuals may often unfortunately be rational in holding such beliefs.

I also have research interests concerning:

• Evidence-resistance

• Norms of inquiry

• Conspiracy theories

• Moral and pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

• Methodological issues in social epistemology

Papers 

Publications

[1] "Radical Epistemology, Theory Choice, and the Priority of the Epistemic" (forthcoming in Synthese)

In Progress 

[1] "Perceptual Experiences Cannot Be Irrational"

[2] "Justified Testimonial Belief without Propositional Speaker Justification"

[3] "Right-Kind Reasons Constitutivism and Moderate Moral Encroachment"